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Abstract 
 
A country’s carbon footprint refers to the CO2 emissions caused by domestic absorption 
activities. Trade in goods drives a wedge between the footprint and local emissions. We 
provide a panel database on carbon footprints and carbon net trade. Using a differences-
in-differences IV estimation strategy, we evaluate the Kyoto Protocol’s effects on carbon 
footprints and emissions. Instrumenting countries’ Kyoto commitment by their participa-
tion in the International Criminal Court, we show that Kyoto reduced domestic emissions 
in committed countries by 7%, has not lowered footprints, but increased the share of 
imported over domestic emissions by 17 percentage points. This indicates carbon leakage. 
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** Corresponding author. 1 Introduction
A country’s carbon footprint accounts for all carbon emissions that the country’s residents cause by
consuming or investing a speciﬁc vector of goods. Whether these goods are produced domestically
or imported does not matter.1 However, the carbon inventories drawn up by the UN’s Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) measure domestic emissions, i.e., the amount of carbon
embodied in the vector of goods produced on a nation’s territory. With international trade in goods, a
country’s carbon footprint and its domestic CO2 emissions need not coincide, the diﬀerence being the
carbon content of net trade.
This paper provides the ﬁrst econometric ex post analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, thereby comple-
menting computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses such as the one by Elliott et al. (2010). For this
purpose, it assembles a new panel database on the carbon footprint of nations. It uses an instrumental
variables (IV) strategy to study the eﬀects of commitments made by some countries under the Kyoto
Protocol on countries’ CO2 emissions and carbon footprints. The key ﬁnding is that, on average, Kyoto
has caused some domestic emission savings. But it has also caused increased net imports of carbon so
that the carbon footprint of countries has not changed. Carbon leakage due to the Protocol’s incomplete
coverage has therefore neutralized emission savings.
The international policy community cares about anthropogenic CO2 emissions because they are be-
lieved to trigger global warming, which can have large negative consequences for global welfare (Stern,
2007). The Kyoto Protocol has been the ﬁrst multilateral attempt to cap carbon emissions. Many ob-
servers think that the design of the Protocol is fundamentally ﬂawed because it exempts emerging and
developing countries,2 and it lacks an enforcement mechanism. Whether it has actually aﬀected countries’
emissions, their carbon footprints or the carbon content of net trade is an unsettled empirical question.
For any successful future international agreement on climate policies, more needs to be known about the
empirical relevance of the leakage phenomenon.
Several diﬃculties aﬀect the empirical analysis. First, selection of countries into the Kyoto Protocol
may be non-random so that estimating treatment eﬀects requires instrumental variables. Second, there is
no harmonized synthetic cross-country measure of climate policy. Following the related literature, we work
with Kyoto commitment dummies. However, these dummies are noisy indicators of true climate policy.
1This is the ﬂow version of the carbon footprint. The stock version refers to accumulated emissions embodied in goods
absorbed over a country’s existence.
2The USA has not ratiﬁed the treaty, presumably because it “leaves out developing countries such as China and India”
(Feenstra and Taylor, 2008, p. 426).
1Containing the ensuing attenuation bias again requires good instruments. Third, for statistical inference
we need to minimize errors in the measurement of countries’ carbon footprints. We use high quality
input-output (I-O) tables and sectoral emission coeﬃcients from oﬃcial sources to calculate footprints.
These data are available only for 40 countries and the period 1995-2007. Covering more than 80% of the
world’s emissions, our data allows using diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences techniques to measure the impact of
Kyoto commitments on domestic CO2 emissions, carbon footprints and net imports.
We report the following ﬁndings. First, carbon emissions embodied in international trade ﬂows are
quantitatively important: in 1995, about 9% of emissions were traded; in 2007 this measure is up to
15%. The increase started in 2002, the ﬁrst year of China’s WTO membership and the year in which
most countries ratiﬁed their Kyoto commitments. Second, there is substantial variation across countries
in the levels and growth rates over time of domestic CO2 emissions and carbon footprints. Third,
a naive inspection of the data suggests that growth rates of carbon footprints do not correlate with
Kyoto commitment status, but growth rates of domestic CO2 emissions do. Fourth, we show that
countries’ ratiﬁcation of the Rome Statute governing the International Criminal Court (ICC) predicts
Kyoto commitment. Our identifying assumption is that a country’s stance on the ICC has no eﬀect on
domestic emissions or footprints so that the ICC membership dummy can be excluded from our second-
stage instrumental variables regressions. The same holds true for trading partners’ ICC status. Fifth,
we use these instruments in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences setup. We ﬁnd that Kyoto commitments have
reduced domestic CO2 emissions on average by about 7% (relative to the unobserved counterfactual),
but the carbon footprint has not decreased. As a consequence, the ratio of CO2 imports over domestic
CO2 emissions (the carbon imports ratio) has increased on average by about 17 percentage points.
Related Literature. A number of descriptive studies present estimates of the carbon footprint of
nations. Hertwich and Peters (2009) do so for 87 countries and 2001 data;3 Davis and Caldeira (2010)
update the analysis to 113 countries and 2004 data. These papers make an impressive eﬀort toward
a comprehensive view on the carbon footprint of nations by including other major greenhouse gases
such as CH4, N2O or F-gases, by accounting for agricultural production, land-use change, international
transportation, and the non-market sector (heating). Only recently a panel data set for 113 regions has
been proposed by Peters et al. (2011). The authors provide detailed estimates for the years 1997, 2001
and 2004 and base their analysis on raw data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).4 In our
3Their data are very nicely presented on a website www.carbonfootprintofnations.com/.
4GTAP I-O data may suﬀer from measurement problems as they are not based on a harmonized data collection and
processing approach. Also, yearly sectoral emission and output data is available for only half of those countries.
2econometric exercise, to minimize measurement error in the dependent variable, we must restrict the
analysis to those 40 countries for which the OECD provides high quality I-O tables and for which there
is oﬃcial data to generate yearly sectoral emission coeﬃcients.
Our study relates to a large tradition in empirical economics to analyze the eﬀects of international or
domestic institutional arrangements on economic outcomes. In virtually all applications, reverse causation
is an issue as the choice of institutions (or policies) and the membership in international organizations is
not exogenous. Moreover, membership is measured by simple dummy variables.5
There is a rich theoretical and quantitative literature on the eﬀectiveness of climate policies in the
presence of international trade; see Copeland and Taylor (2005) for an important early contribution and
de Melo and Mathys (2010) for a survey. An important CGE study by Babiker (2005) uses a model
with increasing returns to scale and an Armington demand system and ﬁnds carbon leakage in excess of
100% in one scenario. Recent work focuses on border tax adjustments as remedies to the carbon leakage
problem. Mattoo et al. (2009) highlight how border tax adjustments could harm developing economies.
Elliott et al. (2010) ﬁnd substantial carbon leakage ranging from 15% at low tax rates to over 25% for
the highest tax rate. Our approach complements the ex ante perspective of CGE models by carrying out
an ex post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol’s eﬀect on the carbon footprint, emissions, and trade.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe how we construct our panel database
on nations’ carbon footprints. Section 3 discusses the selection of countries into commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol and presents our instrumental variables strategy. Section 4 contains our main results and
an array of robustness checks.
2 Measuring the carbon footprint of nations
2.1 Method and data
In the presence of international trade, domestic emissions need not coincide with the CO2 embodied
in domestic consumption and investment, i.e., the country’s carbon footprint. To calculate the carbon
footprint, one has to measure the carbon content of trade, i.e., the CO2 emissions embodied in a country’s
net trade vector. Country i’s carbon footprint at time t, Fi;t, is deﬁned as
Fi;t  Ei;t + EETi;t; (1)
5As examples, see the literature on the eﬀects of IMF (Dreher and Walter, 2010) or WTO membership (Rose, 2004a,b).
3where Ei;t are country i0s domestic CO2 emissions at time t and EETi;t are the CO2 emissions embodied
in net imports.
Accounting method. To obtain a precise estimate of EETi;t, it is crucial to account for the increasing
importance of trade in intermediates and re-exports. Therefore, one has to track each product and its
components along the global production chain to the respective country of origin.6 As an example,
let country A’s sector h use an intermediate input from country B. Country B might assemble this
intermediate from intermediates produced locally or in a country C, D or even A, and so forth. All
those upstream emissions (occurring locally or abroad) must be associated to the ﬁnal consumption of
good h. The multi-region input-output (MRIO) method provides the accounting rule, see e.g. Treﬂer and



















where Bij is the bilateral I-O table of intermediates produced in country i and used in country j and N
is the total number of countries. Bilateral I-O tables Bij are derived from reported multilateral tables
 Bj under the assumption that country i’s share of intermediates h in country j’s sector g is proportional
to its import share in this sector.8
Let ei be country i’s sectoral CO2 emission intensities vector, Xi its vector of sectoral exports and
Mij its vector of sectoral imports from country j. Then the world emission vector e and the trade matrix






















Accordingly, the carbon content of trade is given by
EETi = e(I   B) 1T; (4)
6This is crucial since Metz et al., eds (2007) document wide cross-country heterogeneity in production structures and
sectoral carbon intensities.
7To avoid notational clutter, we suppress time indices in the following.
8Country j0s use of sector g inputs from country i0s sector h is Bij(h;g) = ji(h)  Bj(h;g); where the import share is
ji(h)  Mji(h)=(Qj(h) +
P
k Mjk(h)   Xj(h)) and Qj(h) is country j’s output in sector h; see OECD (2002, p. 12).
4where (I   B) 1 is the Leontief inverse of the I-O table, and I is the identity matrix. So, to empiri-
cally compute EETi;t, one requires input-output tables, bilateral trade data, and sectoral CO2 emission
coeﬃcients, ideally all for the year t.
The data. Harmonized I-O tables for our 40 sample countries are taken from the OECD Input-Output
Tables 2009. They are observed around the years 1995, 2000, and 2005.9 We aggregate the I-O data to
15 ISIC industries to match the available emissions data. We obtain bilateral goods trade data in f.o.b.
values from the UN Comtrade database. We use a concordance table provided by Eurostat10 to translate
the data from the SITC commodity classiﬁcation into ISIC. Information on the level of sectoral CO2
emissions from fuel combustion come from the International Energy Agency (IEA).11 In order to obtain
emission coeﬃcients, we divide sectoral emission levels by some measure of sectoral output. Output data
is obtained from the OECD Structural Analysis Database, the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database
(INDSTAT4), the UN System of National Accounts,12 and OECD I-O tables.13 Our database comprises
40 countries over the period 1995 to 2007; countries are listed in Table I. To model the rest of the world
(RoW), we argue that countries at a similar stage of economic development have similar production
technologies. Therefore, we group countries into three classes according to their level of real GDP per
capita, obtained from the Penn World Table 6.3. Each RoW country is assigned a weighted average of
emission coeﬃcients and I-O tables of sample countries in the same real GDP class.14
2.2 Descriptive evidence
Emissions and carbon footprint. Figure 1 tracks CO2 emission levels in logs for the whole world
and for our sample. The upper (gray, solid) curve relates to the entire world and measures CO2 emissions
as reported by the IEA. From 1995 to 2007 emissions have increased by about 33% (an increase of 7.2
gigatons of CO2); about two thirds of this increase occurred after 2002, the ﬁrst year of China’s WTO
membership and most countries’ year of Kyoto ratiﬁcation. The second curve (black, solid) reports
9We used the I-O tables from 1995 for the years 1995-97, those from 2000 for 1998-2002, and those from 2005 for 2003-07.
Linearly interpolating between observed I-O tables yields very similar results.
10http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon.
11They include CO2 produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas ﬂaring as well as the manufacture
of cement. Note that other sources of CO2 emissions such as fugitive emissions, industrial processes or waste are disregarded.
However, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion make up roughly 80% of total CO2 emissions.
12http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNA&f=group_code%3a203.
13For some countries and years sectoral output data are missing. We impute missing output data by applying growth
rates of output or where those were not available growth rates of real GDP of the respective country and year.
14Alternatively, we apply US emission coeﬃcients and I-O tables to RoW. The obtained carbon footprint series are
virtually the same.
5emissions for our sample of 40 countries. Over the whole period of 13 years, our sample covers a fairly
constant share of about 81.5% of world emissions. The curve closely tracks the behavior of the world total.
Finally, the last curve (gray, dashed) shows the carbon footprint of our sample. This measure closely
tracks our emission data, but not perfectly. The reason is that we do not force our sample world to be
closed; rather, there is trade with the rest of the world. Over the sample period, our sample countries
have consistently run a trade surplus in terms of carbon (i.e., carbon emissions in the group exceed the
carbon footprint).












































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
world CO2 emissions (IEA)
sample CO2 emissions
sample CO2 footprint
Source: Inventoried emissions data from the IEA; Carbon footprint: own calculations. World
corresponds to 187 countries; sample to 40 countries.
Trade in goods and embodied emissions. Figure 2 plots the evolution of CO2 emissions embodied
in international trade (black line). Trade in carbon has increased by about 112% between 1995 and 2007,
the largest share of the absolute increase (92%) happening after 2002. The gray line in Figure 2 tracks
the share of carbon trade in total emissions. The share remains fairly constant around 9% from 1995 to
2002 but increases drastically from 2003 onwards to reach 15% in 2007. This is partly explained by a
quite substantial increase in the carbon intensity of trade from 2003 onwards (not shown).
Country level comparisons. Table I shows detailed information about the countries included in our
sample. With ﬁve exceptions (Australia, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia and Switzerland), ratiﬁcation
of the Kyoto Protocol has taken place in the year of 2002. In 1995, emissions per capita (in tons of
CO2) vary dramatically across countries. At the lower end, emissions per capita in India or Indonesia
are 0.85 and 0.97 tons, while they are 19.26, 15.87, and 15.67 tons per capita at the higher end in the










































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
sample CO2 content of trade, right scale
CO2 trade as share of total emissions, left scale
Source: CO2 content of trade: own calculations. Sample (40 countries).
US, Australia, and Canada. Average yearly growth rates of per capita emission levels range from 5.16%
in China to -1.97% in Sweden.15 Regressing those growth rates on the logarithm of initial emission levels
yields a coeﬃcient of -1.26 (robust t-value -4.67), so that there is a substantial amount of (absolute)
convergence.
Turning to carbon footprints, countries with high per capita emissions also have high per capita
footprints; the coeﬃcient of correlation is 0.92. There is also evidence for convergence, but the estimated
coeﬃcient is smaller (-0.78, t-value -5.06). However, the coeﬃcient of correlation between the growth
rates of per capita emissions and footprints is 0.28 and only marginally signiﬁcant. Finally, the last
two columns in Table I show net CO2 imports in percent of domestic emissions of the years 1995 and
2007. Somewhat less than two thirds of countries have positive net imports. Net carbon imports can be
very substantial: e.g., in 2007, Switzerland imports goods that embody almost 156% of domestic CO2
emissions. Imports in Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and France also exceed 30% of
domestic emissions. The share of carbon emissions exported is highest in China (30%), South Africa
(24%), the Czech Republic (24%) and Australia (16%).
15Since our starting year is 1995, industrial restructuring in formerly communist economies has mostly come to an end.
73 Empirical strategy
3.1 Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation
We are interested in estimating the eﬀect that Kyoto commitment has on countries’ carbon dioxide
emissions, carbon footprints, and carbon trade. Our working hypothesis is that the year of ratiﬁcation
of the Kyoto Protocol in national parliaments designates the point in time from which on Kyoto may
have had an impact on policies and, thus, on outcomes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that countries have
engaged in a ﬂurry of policy initiatives after ratiﬁcation.16
In order to estimate the average treatment eﬀect of a Kyoto commitment, we use a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach. To avoid reporting spurious results, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and work with
long averages rather than with yearly data. For this purpose, we deﬁne diﬀerent treatment periods and
corresponding pre- and post-treatment periods. Our preferred speciﬁcation deﬁnes the treatment period
as the years 2001-03, when all countries (except Russia and Australia) have ratiﬁed the Protocol. The
pre- and post-treatment period are symmetric around the treatment period and deﬁned as the four-year
intervals 1997-2000 and 2004-07.17 Hence, we base our analysis on 80 pre- and post-treatment averages.
This strategy deals with country-speciﬁc business cycles. First-diﬀerencing eliminates any country-speciﬁc
time-invariant determinants of the relevant outcome variables (e.g., climatic conditions, endowments with
diﬀerent types of energy resources, geographic location, preferences of the representative consumers, etc.)
thereby reducing omitted variables bias. Hence, the speciﬁcation takes the form
Outcomei;t =  + Kyotoi;t + X
0








where  denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, and t 2 fpre;postg(T = 2).  is a constant accounting
for a common time trend that would aﬀect the treatment and the control groups alike. Ei;t;Fi;t;EETi;t
are deﬁned in (1). Xi;t is a vector of controls and includes amongst others the log of population, the
log of GDP and an EU dummy. The controls are motivated in more detail when presenting the results.
Kyotoit is a dummy taking value 1 if country i has Kyoto commitments in period t: Due to our two-period
setup, Kyotoi;t = Kyotoi;t. We correct the variance-covariance matrix for heteroskedasticity. Before
addressing the crucial question of instrumenting Kyoto; we set  = 0 in equation (5) and show scatter
16See data displayed on www.lowcarboneconomy.com/Low_Carbon_World/Data/View/12.
17Russia has ratiﬁed in 2004 and is counted as treated in our analysis; Australia has ratiﬁed in late 2007 and is put into
the control group. We present robustness checks pertaining to these choices below.
8plots and univariate regressions to obtain a ﬁrst impression on the eﬀect of Kyoto on outcome variables.






























































































































































Note: The graphs show scatter plots of diﬀerences between pre- and post-treatment period averages in log CO2
emissions and footprints per capita and in the share of CO2 imports over domestic emissions for committed and
non-committed countries. The graphs also show ﬁtted linear regression lines with 95% (heteroskedasticity-robust)
conﬁdence intervals.
Regression coeﬃcients and robust standard errors (in parentheses): Emissions  0:16 (0:00); footprint  0:06(0:12);
carbon import ratio 10:87 (0:00).
Figure 3 plots the change between the pre- and post-treatment period average of log CO2 emissions, log
carbon footprints (both in per capita terms) and the carbon import share against the Kyoto commitment
dummy. The left-most panel reveals that between the two periods domestic CO2 emissions have, on
average, grown by 20% in the subsample of non-committed countries compared to 4% in the subsample
of committed countries. This diﬀerence, 16 percentage points, is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
When looking at the middle panel – footprints – the evidence is less clear-cut. On average, the growth rate
of per-capita carbon footprints appears by 6 percentage points higher in the subsample of non-committed
countries, but that diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the right-most panel compares the
change in the CO2 import share. That share has increased by 11 percentage points more in the sample
of committed countries, the diﬀerence being statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The evidence displayed in Figure 3 is suggestive. It points toward the possibility that Kyoto com-
mitments have indeed reduced domestic CO2 emissions, but not the carbon footprint. Kyoto would thus
9have led to delocation of carbon-intensive production and to an increase in carbon trade, but not to a
reduction of committed countries’ absorption as captured by the carbon footprints. While Figure 3 can
deal with constant level diﬀerences across countries and common time trends, it cannot address the non-
random selection of countries into the Kyoto Protocol. The reported eﬀects may be spurious if countries
with beneﬁcial emission projections, for example, might be more willing to commit to an emission target
under Kyoto. The next section models countries’ selection into Kyoto and identiﬁes variables that explain
selection but not emissions.
3.2 Instrumental variable strategy
In this paper, we propose countries’ membership at the International Criminal Court as an instrument
for Kyoto commitment. The ICC, headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands, is a permanent tribunal
to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Like the UNFCCC, the ICC is a multilateral policy initiative under the umbrella of the United Nations
Organization. The Rome Statute governing the ICC was ﬁnally signed in 1998 and ratiﬁed, until December
2010, by 114 countries. 34 countries, including the US, India, and China, have decided not to ratify the
Statute. Groves (2009) likens the Kyoto Protocol to the Rome Statute and argues that both initiatives
threaten US sovereignty.18 Indeed, countries’ preferences for multilateral international policy initiatives,
proxied by their involvement in the ICC, turn out to correlate robustly to Kyoto commitment. The
maintained assumption is that ICC involvement of a country is not caused by carbon emissions or the
footprint and that it does not directly aﬀect these outcome variables, neither.19
Our selection equation takes the following form
Kyotoi;t = 0 + 1ICCi;t + 2W:ICCi;t + 3lnPopi;t 1 + Z
0
it + "it; (6)
where ICCit is a dummy taking the value 1 if a country has ratiﬁed the Rome Statute. Data on ICC
membership stems from the UN Treaty Series database. The variable W:ICCi;t captures ICC membership




DistijICCj;t; where Distij is geographical distance between
countries i and j; and Popj;t is population. Popj;t=Distij is a conventional spatial weight. It ensures that
18Similarly, Mike Huckabee (2007), former Governor of Arkansas, argues that the Kyoto Protocol “would have given
foreign nations the power to impose standards on us.“ China’s stance in the Copenhagen climate change negotiations was
similar.
19Other multilateral treaties, such as those governing the WTO or international environmental questions cannot be easily
excluded since they will aﬀect emissions directly either through “green” preferences of voters and consumers, or through
trade policy.
10W:ICCi;t increases when other countries ratify the Rome Statute, and does so most when those countries
are large and close by. Data on population and GDPs stem from the World Bank World Development
Indicators and data on bilateral distance from the CEPII distance database. lnPopi;t 1 refers to the log
of population as of the period before the pre-treatment period. The ICC and lagged population variables
are the instruments that we exclude from our second-stage regressions. The vector Z
0
it may coincide
with the vector X
0
it of equation (5). It may contain other potential variables that may play a role for the
selection of a country into the Kyoto Protocol such as WTOit and EUit; dummy variables that take value
1 if country i is a WTO or EU member at time t, respectively. The vector also includes lnMEAi;t which
counts the number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) other than the Kyoto Protocol that
country i has ratiﬁed up to period t: Data on MEAs are obtained from the International Environmental
Agreement Database Project.20 In some speciﬁcations, the vector Z
0
it may also include Polityi;t, which
measures country i0s political orientation (autocracy / democracy) using the Polity2 index from the Polity
IV Data Series 2009. The index ranges from -10 to 10, where higher values indicate a stronger level of
democracy. It may also include the log of GDP. Table II provides summary statistics of the variables.
We estimate (6) using Probit and ordinary least squares (OLS). Probit results are presented as average
marginal eﬀects so that the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as contributions to the probability of Kyoto
commitment. Table III reports the results. Column (1) shows that, in a Probit model, a country which
has ratiﬁed the Rome Statute and is therefore a member of the ICC has a 43.8 percentage points higher
likelihood to commit to binding Kyoto commitments. Column (2) adds the spatial lag of ICC membership
(i.e., membership of other countries, weighted by their relevance to the country under consideration). The
spatial lag not being a dummy variable, the marginal eﬀect is evaluated at the average of that variable.
Including it increases the fraction of variance explained from 15 to 41% and the Chi2-statistic well above
the threshold of 10. The average predicted success is 0.680 (the sample mean is 0.675). The ICC
membership variables will be excluded from the second-stage equation; the covariates added in column
(3) will be included. Log population turns out to be a strong predictor of Kyoto commitments: fast
growing economies have a strongly reduced probability to have commitments. Evaluated at the average
growth rate (about 4.5%) the gradient of the Probit function is very steep. The log stock of other MEAs,
i.e., excluding Kyoto, is a proxy for green preferences. It has a positive inﬂuence on ratiﬁcation of the
Kyoto Protocol, but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the Polity index suggests
that an increase in the democratic stance of countries lowers the odds for Kyoto commitments. This
is because in the period under considerations many non-committed countries have strongly improved
20http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=list_countries.php
11their Polity ratings (Indonesia by 8 points, Mexico by 1.5 points, and Chile by 1.25 points). Finally, the
coeﬃcient on log GDP appears with a positive sign, but is statistically insigniﬁcant. GDP growth does
not predict the ratiﬁcation of Kyoto commitments.
In our second-stage regressions, we will ﬁnd that population explains emissions and the carbon foot-
print with elasticities statistically identical to unity. In our preferred speciﬁcations, we therefore work
with dependent variables in per capita terms and suppress population from the left-hand side. So, in the
following columns, we suppress population. Column (4) shows that the ICC variables continue to ex-
plain Kyoto commitment when China is excluded from the sample; column (5) ﬁnds the same picture by
dropping those transition countries that have become EU members between the pre- and post-treatment
periods. Finally, column (6) returns to the full sample, but estimates the equation by OLS (linear proba-
bility model). It includes a WTO dummy into the equation (essentially a China dummy). The coeﬃcients
on the ICC variables still are signiﬁcant and have the same signs and magnitudes as in the Probit re-
gressions. Dropping the non-signiﬁcant covariates moves the F-statistic easily above the threshold of
10.
Columns (7) to (10) introduce a diﬀerent potential instrument, namely the lag of log population (i.e.,
between the averages 1993-96 and 1997-2000). Whether controls such as log of GDP or the Polity index
are included or not, or whether the full sample is used or whether new EU members are excluded or not,
does not change the fact that higher past population growth strongly reduces the likelihood of ratifying
Kyoto commitment. The share of variance explained ranges between 68 and 90%. Finally, columns (11)
and (12) feature the ICC variables along with past population growth in linear probability models. Own
ICC membership and the spatial lag thereof have the expected signs but carry p-values of 0.13 and 0.12,
respectively. However, they are jointly signiﬁcant at the 2% level. The lagged log of population continues
to have a strong negative eﬀect. Adding covariates does not change this picture. In both columns, the
share of explained variance is about 65% and the F-statistics are well above 25.
Our identiﬁcation assumption is the following: Membership to the ICC is not caused by growth in
carbon emissions or in the carbon footprint of nations. ICC membership does not directly aﬀect growth in
carbon emissions or the carbon footprint, neither.21 Past population growth is another potential instru-
ment, in particular if we work with dependent variables in per capita terms so that the contemporaneous
population lag disappears from the left-hand side regressors. Then, it should not aﬀect contemporane-
ous changes in emissions or the footprint or be caused by those variables. Since we have more than a
21ICC membership may be a proxy for a country’s overall preference for multilateralism. Our diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
strategy accounts for that preference as long as it does not change over time. In our second-stage regressions, we include the
stock of other multilateral environmental agreements and membership in the WTO to capture the time-variant component.
12single instrument, we can compute overidentiﬁcation tests to verify whether the instruments are indeed
uncorrelated with the error term, and are thus rightfully excluded from the estimated equation.
4 Benchmark results: Kyoto has aﬀected ﬁrms but not consumers
Table IV presents our benchmark results. Columns (1) to (6) present OLS estimations, the remaining
columns show evidence from IV regressions. In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variables are expressed
in absolute terms while columns (4) to (12) express the variables in per capita terms. All regressions
are on ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data, where the pre-treatment period is 1997-2000, and the post-treatment period
is 2004-07. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and ﬁnite-sample adjusted.22 All regressions
include a constant (not shown).
4.1 OLS estimates
Column (1) of Table IV regresses the log of domestic CO2 emissions on the Kyoto status dummy variable,
the log of population, and the log of GDP. This parsimonious regression explains a surprising 54% of
the total variation in emissions. The Kyoto dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (p-value of 0.06). The estimate implies that Kyoto commitment is associated with a decrease in
domestic emissions by about 7.7% (relative to the unobserved counterfactual of no commitment). So,
without its commitment the average Kyoto country would have increased its emissions by more than
the actual 4% between the pre- and post-treatment period. The estimated elasticity of emissions with
respect to population size is 1.1 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The elasticity is statistically
identical to unity (the F-test on unity cannot reject with a p-value of 0.72). Hence, population growth
translates one-to-one into emission growth. The unitary elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to
population is a fairly robust ﬁnding.23 The elasticity of emissions with respect to GDP is about 0.38
and statistically signiﬁcant, thereby replicating the stylized fact that – holding population constant –
economic growth reduces the carbon intensity of economies. Squared GDP or population terms do not
turn out statistically signiﬁcant and are therefore excluded.24 Column (2) turns to the carbon footprint.
Here, the estimated eﬀect of Kyoto is positive, smaller in absolute terms, and statistically insigniﬁcant.
The elasticity of population size is again statistically identical to unity (p-value of 0.94), and the elasticity
22The employed STATA routine is described in Schaﬀer (2005).
23See Cole and Neumayer (2004), who have worked with a larger sample and longer time coverage.
24The literature on the carbon Kuznets curve has mixed results so far, see e.g. Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004).
13on GDP is about 0.43. Squared terms are again irrelevant and are therefore dropped. So, while GDP
or population exert very similar eﬀects on domestic emissions and on the carbon footprint, our results
suggest that Kyoto did not have a measurable eﬀect on the carbon footprint of nations. Since emissions
apparently did go down, Kyoto commitment increased the CO2 content of imports. Column (3) veriﬁes
this conjecture by regressing net carbon imports as a share of domestic carbon emissions on the Kyoto
commitment dummy. The point estimate is positive, statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (p-value
of 0.03). It implies that Kyoto commitment increases the CO2 import share by about 11.8 percentage
points. Population and GDP both have positive signs but are statistically insigniﬁcant. The regression is
less successful than the preceeding ones in explaining outcome variance (adjusted R2 is 0.21). Dropping
the insigniﬁcant variables slightly reduces the point estimate of Kyoto to 0.11, but lowers the robust
standard error to 0.03.
Since the eﬀect on log population in columns (1) to (2) is statistically identical to unity, it is useful to
divide the regression equation by the log of population and express the dependent variable in per capita
terms. This saves valuable degrees of freedom. Columns (4) to (5) show that this transformation has only
a marginal eﬀect on the point estimates of Kyoto commitment, slightly reduces the root mean squared
error, and improves the accuracy of estimates. It still holds that Kyoto reduces domestic emissions,
increases carbon imports but has not aﬀected the carbon footprint. In most of the remaining analysis,
we therefore work with dependent variables deﬁned in per capita terms.
4.2 IV estimates
Regressions (1) to (6) in Table IV assume that the error term is uncorrelated with the Kyoto dummy.
As explained before, this is unlikely to be true: countries expecting a downward trend on their emissions
may be particularly willing to commit to Kyoto targets so that OLS estimates will be biased away
from zero. Hence, an IV approach is needed. At the same time, however, IV estimation also cures
measurement error in the Kyoto variable which is possibly large, too: Kyoto commitment is only a very
imperfect proxy for countries’ carbon policies. This biases OLS estimates toward zero. The net bias
is therefore unclear. Column (7) to (12) instrument the Kyoto dummy with the ratiﬁcation status of
the ICC treaty, the spatial lag thereof, and the lagged growth rate of population. In all speciﬁcations,
we report a battery of diagnostics to check the validity of our IV strategy. In particular, we report the
p-value associated to the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that
the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The reported J-statistic is consistent in the presence
14of heteroskedasticity.25 Finally, we show the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic
on the excluded instruments. Following Stock and Yogo (2005), we report the maximum bias of IV
estimation due to weak instruments. The ﬁrst maximum bias relates to the actual (i.e., diﬀerent from
the undistorted F) maximal size of the Wald test; the second deﬁnes weak instruments in terms of the
maximum bias of the candidate IV estimator relative to the squared bias of the OLS estimator. The idea
is to compare the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic matrix to a critical value. The critical value is determined by
the IV estimator in use, the number of instruments, the number of included endogenous regressors, and
how much bias or size distortion the researcher is willing to tolerate. Stock et al. (2002) suggest that an
instrument is “weak” if 2SLS relative bias exceeds 10% or the actual size of the nominal 5% 2SLS t-test
exceeds 15%.
In regressions (7) to (9), the F-statistic on the excluded instruments is 29.54, well beyond the canonical
10% and implying the lowest possible maximum biases as of Stock and Yogo (2005). The overidentiﬁcation
test cannot reject the null of instrument validity, while the underidentiﬁcation test does reject, signalling
instrument relevance. Accordingly, it appears that our IV strategy is valid. Compared to the OLS
estimates presented in columns (4) to (6), the IV estimates of columns (7) to (9) yield very comparable
results. Kyoto decreases domestic emissions by about 8.5%, does not aﬀect the carbon footprint, and
drives up net carbon imports by about 14 percentage points.
Columns (10) to (12) implement speciﬁcations with additional controls. These more complete regres-
sions are our preferred speciﬁcations. An important control is membership in the WTO, a key multilateral
institution. In our sample, including a WTO dummy is equivalent to including a China dummy. In both
the emissions and the footprint equation that dummy is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Ceteris paribus, China’s emissions are 30% and its carbon footprint 17% higher than the rest of the
world average. Including a control for the degree of democracy of a country’s political system (Polity)
appears to aﬀect emissions, footprints and net carbon imports positively, carbon footprints being most
strongly aﬀected. Reforms that increase the democratic stature of countries often also spur growth. The
log of the stock of other (than Kyoto) multilateral environmental agreements is meant to proxy for coun-
tries’ green preferences. They do not exert a measurable eﬀect, but it is important to note that there is
very little time variation in this variable. Finally, we control for EU membership. Domestic emissions are
aﬀected negatively, but carbon footprint and net carbon trade are not aﬀected. These additional controls
25We also compute an underidentiﬁcation test of whether the equation is identiﬁed, i.e., that the excluded instruments
are relevant (correlated with the endogenous regressors). The null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentiﬁed. The
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistic is heteroskedasticity-robust. That test always rejects with p-values lower than 0.01,
so that we do not report it to save space.
15change the estimated Kyoto eﬀects only very slightly: Kyoto decreases domestic emissions by about 7%,
but now appears to increase the CO2 footprint by about 8.8%. That latter eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level (p-value 0.057). The production eﬀect minus the absorption eﬀect approximates the
eﬀect on net imports which is now at 16.8 percentage points.26
Summarizing, our benchmark IV regressions suggest that Kyoto commitments have a measurable
negative eﬀect on CO2 emissions, but leave the CO2 footprint either unchanged or higher than in the
counterfactual situation. Increased carbon imports from countries with inferior production technologies
explain this pattern. Kyoto has aﬀected ﬁrms – who have reduced emissions, possibly by outsourcing
production to non-committed countries – but not consumers – who have not changed their consumption
habits.
5 Robustness checks
The remaining analysis in this paper discusses a wide array of robustness checks ranging from using
diﬀerent country samples to applying alternative IV strategies and treatment windows. Results always
compare to columns (10) to (12) of our benchmark Table IV. The thrust of our argument continues
to hold: Kyoto has led to increased net imports in committed countries but has not reduced carbon
footprints. Results are summarized in Table V; full regression output is found in the web appendix
(Tables A1 to A4).
5.1 Alternative samples
Excluding China. Panel A of Table V varies the sample of countries that underly the regressions. In
columns (A1) to (A3), we drop China from the sample. One could easily imagine that China’s special
situation, also due to its entry into the WTO in 2002, drives the pattern discovered in our benchmark
regressions. However, quite the opposite is true. While the positive eﬀect of Kyoto commitment on
domestic emissions becomes less pronounced (now standing at about 5.4%, measured only at the 10%
level of signiﬁcance (p-value of 0.08)), the carbon footprint of countries now turns out to be aﬀected more
strongly and more decisively positively than without China in the sample (now at about 9.7% with a
p-value of 0.04). As a consequence, Kyoto pushes net imports of carbon up by 16.1 percentage points.
As shown by the overidentiﬁcation and the weak instruments test, our IV strategy remains valid.
26Expressing net carbon imports relative to domestic carbon footprints or refraining from any normalization leads to
similar signs and levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
16Excluding transition countries. Columns (A4) to (A6) exclude Germany, Slovakia, Romania, and
Poland from the sample. These countries have inherited a substantial industrial production base from
formerly centrally planned economies and have also reduced domestic emissions by at least 0.5 percent
per year (see Table I). It is often argued that the small overall success of the group of committed countries
is an artifact of those transition countries’ industrial restructuring, as heavily polluting old plants were
replaced by more eﬃcient ones. However, this does not seem to drive our results. Note that our IV
strategy identiﬁes the eﬀect of Kyoto against the counterfactual of no Kyoto and not against any speciﬁc
business-as-usual trajectory. Excluding those transition countries largely conﬁrms our benchmark results:
Kyoto has lowered domestic emissions by about 7.7% (p-value 0.04), increased the carbon footprint by
about 9.6% (p-value 0.04), and increased net carbon imports by about 18.1 percentage points (p-value
0.00). In all regressions, the F-statistic on excluded instruments remains high (38.14), and the other
ﬁrst-stage diagnostics signal validity of our strategy.27
Excluding all ex-communist countries. Finally, columns (A7) to (A9) exclude all eight ex-communist
countries from the sample. This decreases the sample size quite a bit and makes inference harder. Also
the quality of our instruments is aﬀected. The F-statistic on excluded instruments falls to 12.88, which
is, however, still above the alert level of 10. Compared to our benchmark regressions, the lower F-
statistic implies that the maximum 2SLS bias relative to the OLS endogeneity bias is now 10% rather
than 5% according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. In terms of results, Kyoto no longer
has a measurable impact on domestic CO2 emissions. The increase in the carbon footprint is now solely
driven by an increase in net carbon imports of 15.7 percentage points. The results obtained by excluding
the ex-communist countries yields the most pessimistic picture possible: Kyoto appears to have trig-
gered delocation of production to dirtier countries without giving rise to emission savings in committed
countries.
5.2 Alternative IV strategies
Using ICC instruments only. In our benchmark regressions, we have used three instruments for the
Kyoto dummy: ICC membership, its spatial lag, and lagged population growth. In Panel B of Table V, we
assess whether this choice of instruments inﬂuences the results. Columns (B1) to (B3) use only the ICC
variables as instruments. Stock and Yogo (2005) propose to use limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) instead of IV to reduce a possible bias due to weak instruments. The ﬁrst-stage diagnostics
27The overidentiﬁcation test fails to reject the null of validity at the somewhat marginal 11% level in column (A6).
17show that the overidentiﬁcation (and underidentiﬁcation test, not reported) yield satisfactory results.
The F-statistic on excluded instruments, however, is now only 4.33. This is lower than the Staiger and
Stock (1997) 2SLS rule of thumb which requires a minimum value of 10 for a strong instrument.28 Stock
and Yogo (2005) show that this rule is too conservative with LIML estimation. Their tabulations imply
that the true power of the F-test is 20%, which is large (but not excessive). This IV strategy biases the
absolute value of Kyoto estimates upwards. The pattern discovered in our benchmark table, however,
remains intact: Kyoto reduces domestic emissions, increases carbon imports, and has no eﬀect on the
carbon footprint.
Lagged population growth as only instrument. Next, we use a single instrument only, namely
lagged population growth (columns (B4) to (B6)). The F-statistic on the excluded instrument is large,
so that the instrument appears strong. The idea of the instrument is that lagged population growth
correlates with countries’ willingness to commit to climate goals, but not to current emission growth.
The eﬀect of current population growth on emission increases is captured by expressing the dependent
variables in per capita terms. This IV strategy yields estimates of the Kyoto eﬀect close to the benchmark
estimates.
Wooldridge two-step procedure. Finally, columns (B7) to (B9) apply a procedure proposed by
Wooldridge (2002, p. 623 f.). It consists in estimating the binary response model (3) in Table III by
maximum likelihood (Probit),29 and obtain the ﬁtted probabilities ^ . The variable ^  is then used as an
instrument in a standard IV approach. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 54.73, so that the
instrumental variable appears strong. We ﬁnd again that Kyoto commitment reduces domestic emissions
(by about 8.3%), has a weakly signiﬁcant but positive eﬀect on the carbon footprint, and increases net
imports of CO2.
5.3 Alternative deﬁnitions of the dependent variables
Carbon intensities. Panel C of Table V varies the deﬁnition of the dependent variables. In columns (C1)
and (C2), emissions are relative to GDP. As shown by the ﬁrst-stage diagnostics, this modiﬁcation keeps
the IV strategy intact. Compared to the benchmark regressions, the sign pattern of coeﬃcients is fairly
28The maximum relative bias test cannot be performed in these regressions since the equations are not “suﬃciently”
overidentiﬁed, see Stock and Yogo (2005).
29Using a linear model yields comparable results, but the obtained instrument is somewhat less powerful. The choice of
a non-linear selection model helps with identiﬁcation of the Kyoto eﬀects.
18similar. Instead of including GDP, we use GDP per capita whenever the dependent variable is in per
GDP terms. It turns out that higher GDP per capita has a strong negative inﬂuence on emission intensi-
ties. Richer countries have higher emissions per capita, but lower emission intensities (see also Cole and
Neumayer, 2004). The eﬀect of Kyoto commitment on the CO2 intensity of production is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (p-value 0.02): Kyoto reduces that intensity by 7.6%. In line with
our results on emissions per capita, Kyoto has no measurable eﬀect on the CO2 intensity of absorption;
the point estimate is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant (p-value 0.13). Net carbon imports are again
positively aﬀected.
Computing carbon footprints holding I-O tables ﬁxed. Columns (C4) to (C6) apply a diﬀerent
method in calculating the carbon footprint. Rather than using new I-O tables when they are available,
they are now held ﬁxed to the year 2000. This modiﬁcation has no importance for measured domestic CO2
emissions, but aﬀects the calculation of the carbon footprint and net carbon imports. In column (C4),
the carbon footprint is expressed in per capita terms; in column (C5) it is expressed in CO2 intensity
terms. In both cases, the estimated eﬀect of Kyoto is positive but statistically zero (p-values of 0.23 and
0.42, respectively). Coeﬃcients on controls do not change much relative to the benchmark regressions.
Column (C6) shows that Kyoto still exerts a positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on net carbon imports
(p-value of 0.003), comparable in size to the benchmark estimates.
Alternative treatment of rest-of-the-world. In the benchmark regressions, we treat the technology
matrix of the RoW aggregate as an average over observed countries.30 In the robustness checks presented
in columns (C7) to (C9), we instead assume that the RoW has the US technology matrix. Assuming
US technology has some tradition in the empirical factor content of trade literature (see Feenstra (2004)
for a survey) and often has important implications for results. In the present context, however, this
assumption makes little diﬀerence to the interesting coeﬃcients: Kyoto has a positive eﬀect on countries’
per-capita carbon footprint (column C7), but no measurable eﬀect on absorption per GDP (column C8).
Net carbon imports (column C9) are still aﬀected positively.
5.4 Alternative treatment windows
In the benchmark regressions, we deﬁned the treatment window to comprise the years 2001-03. In this
window, most countries have, if at all, ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol. In Panel D of Table V we perform
30See Section 2 for details.
19robustness checks pertaining to this choice. We keep pre- and post-treatment windows of similar length.31
Narrow treatment window. We start by looking at the results when we deﬁne the pre-treatment
period to be 1997-2001 and the post-treatment period to be 2003-07. The treatment window, i.e., the
period over which the Kyoto dummy switches from zero to unity is then conﬁned to the year of 2002.32
Columns (D1) to (D3) of Panel D show that the Kyoto eﬀects on emissions, footprints, and net imports
are very much in line with the benchmark results; also the coeﬃcients on covariates vary only a bit. The
IV strategy is valid for emissions and footprint as the dependent variable; the Hansen overidentifying test,
however, rejects at the 10% level when the dependent variable is net imports, therefore casting doubts
over the validity of the instruments in this case.33 The estimated eﬀect of Kyoto, however, does not
deviate strongly from our benchmark case. Eliminating the MEA variable leads the Hansen test not to
reject any more.
Broad treatment window. Next, we deﬁne the pre-treatment period to be 1997-2000 and the post-
treatment period to be 2004-07. The resulting wide treatment window now comprises all ratiﬁcations
(except that of Australia). The sign pattern obtained from regressions presented in columns (D4) to (D6)
compares well to the benchmark results. As before, the Hansen test narrowly rejects in the net imports
speciﬁcation.
Treatment at start of year 2005. Finally, we assume that treatment started in the beginning of
the year 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol formally entered into force.34 The pre-treatment period then
is 2002-04 while the post-treatment period is 2005-07. With this deﬁnition, the IV strategy is valid for
all dependent variables: the F-statistic on excluded instruments is higher than 100, and the Hansen test
cannot reject instrument validity. The resulting point estimates of Kyoto commitment are estimated at
satisfactory precision for emissions and net imports. Domestic emissions go down by about 6.3%, while
net imports as a share of domestic emissions increase by about 7.9 percentage points.
31In principle, we could deﬁne the pre-treatment window always as starting in 1995. We have tried this in additional
robustness checks: results do not change. However, we prefer to compute averages over symmetrically deﬁned periods.
32Switzerland, Romania and Russia are still coded as treated.
33When expressing the dependent variable as the share of domestic carbon consumption, the overidentiﬁcation test does
not reject any more; the point estimate is comparable.
34The Protocol became legally binding after Russia’s ratiﬁcation pushed the share of world emissions as of 1990 covered
by Kyoto over the 55% threshold. The EU, Japan, and Canada and other countries had declared earlier on that they would
treat the emission reduction targets as binding even in the absence of Russia’s ratiﬁcation.
205.5 Additional robustness checks
We have also experimented with a balanced panel of yearly observations. Results are reported in Table A5
in the web appendix. The ﬁrst 6 columns use the within transformation to control for unobserved time-
invariant country-speciﬁc determinants of emissions. Columns (1) to (3) present OLS estimates, while
columns (4) to (6) apply our benchmark IV strategy to this setup. Not surprisingly, with dramatically
increased degrees of freedom (we now have 520 observations), it is possible to calculate Kyoto eﬀects at
higher statistical precision. The OLS estimates suggest that Kyoto has decreased domestic CO2 emissions
by about 2.9%, increased the carbon footprint by about 3.6%, and led to higher net carbon imports by 8
percentage points. The signs of the covariates are sensible; note that our proxy for green preferences (the
number of MEAs other than Kyoto ratiﬁed by a country) now reduces the carbon footprint. Turning to
IV estimates in columns (4) to (6), the sign pattern of Kyoto coeﬃcients is preserved. Point estimates
increase, reﬂecting the presence of important measurement error in the Kyoto variable. Instrumenting
does not alter the estimated coeﬃcients on covariates much. The IV strategy appears valid, with the
over- and underidentiﬁcation tests yielding good results and the F-statistic on excluded instruments at
81.48.35
6 Conclusion
We have estimated the eﬀect of Kyoto commitments on domestic CO2 emissions, carbon footprints and net
carbon imports. We have done so by exploiting a newly constructed panel data set of yearly observations
from 1995-2007 for 40 countries. Our inference is based on the diﬀerences between committed and non-
committed countries over two time periods: a pre-treatment period of 1997-2000 and a post-treatment
period of 2004-07. This diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach is demanding as it is eﬀectively based on a
cross-section of only 40 rates of change. We use an IV strategy that exploits correlation between countries’
commitment to Kyoto and that to the International Criminal Court, as well as lagged population growth.
We ﬁnd a robust pattern in the data: On average, Kyoto commitment has reduced domestic emissions
by about 7%. It has not consistently aﬀected the carbon footprint. The diﬀerence between production
and absorption being made up by international trade, Kyoto commitment has increased the ratio of net
carbon imports over domestic emissions by about 17 percentage points.
35Estimation based on ﬁrst-diﬀerenced yearly data is less successful. The OLS model does not reveal any impact of Kyoto
commitment on outcome variables. The IV model resurrects the sign pattern that we have seen throughout the tables of
this paper (domestic emissions down, footprint unchanged, net imports up), but instruments appear too weak in the context
of yearly diﬀerenced data.
21Our results imply that the Kyoto Protocol has given rise to substantial relocation of production
(carbon leakage). Committed countries have reduced their emissions relative to the counterfactual of
no Kyoto, but they have not reduced their carbon footprints. Some of our estimates even suggest the
opposite. It follows that the Kyoto Protocol, due to its incomplete coverage, has been ineﬀective or
possibly even harmful for the global climate. It has imposed substantial costs on ﬁrms and consumers
in committed countries, but the return of all these eﬀorts – lower global carbon emissions – has been
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our results lend empirical support to the case that unilateral
climate policies bear very little promise. Either future global climate deals have to cover all major
economies, or committed countries have to apply border tax adjustments to contain the carbon leakage
problem.
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India 0,85 2,65% 0,71 3,19% ‐16,9% ‐11,3%
Indonesia 0,97 4,19% 1,02 2,97% 4,9% ‐9,4%
Brazil 1,46 1,69% 1,46 2,06% 0,0% 4,5%
China 2,46 5,16% 2,17 3,25% ‐11,5% ‐29,5%
Turkey 2,46 3,03% 2,59 1,74% 5,3% ‐9,8%
Chile 2,91 3,36% 3,21 2,83% 10,1% 3,4%
Mexico 3,33 1,58% 2,87 3,01% ‐13,9% 2,3%
Argentina 3,35 1,60% 3,44 1,15% 2,7% ‐2,7%
Portugal 2002 4,80 0,64% 5,37 1,32% 11,9% 21,4%
Romania 2001 5,16 ‐1,86% 4,85 ‐0,54% ‐6,0% 10,1%
Hungary 2002 5,56 ‐0,22% 5,31 1,03% ‐4,5% 10,9%
Switzerland 2003 5,73 ‐0,22% 11,33 1,93% 97,7% 155,9%
Spain 2002 5,88 3,09% 6,21 3,74% 5,7% 14,2%
France 2002 5,92 ‐0,18% 7,10 0,88% 19,9% 36,1%
Sweden 2002 6,48 ‐1,97% 7,60 0,77% 17,3% 63,0%
South Africa 6,56 0,72% 5,30 0,18% ‐19,1% ‐24,2%
New Zealand 2002 6,69 2,08% 7,60 1,23% 13,7% 2,7%
Slovenia 2002 6,91 1,14% 5,92 2,20% ‐14,3% ‐2,6%
Greece 2002 6,96 2,27% 7,32 3,19% 5,2% 17,4%
Italy 2002 7,15 0,42% 7,44 1,10% 4,0% 12,9%
Austria 2002 7,30 1,26% 9,15 1,07% 25,3% 22,4%
Norway 2002 7,53 0,49% 10,10 1,66% 34,2% 54,4%
Slovak Republic 2002 7,62 ‐1,00% 7,04 1,02% ‐7,6% 17,7%
Korea, Rep. 8,09 1,88% 7,72 2,31% ‐4,5% 0,5%
Poland 2002 8,58 ‐0,68% 7,38 ‐0,31% ‐14,0% ‐10,2%
Israel 8,65 0,71% 9,91 ‐0,22% 14,5% 2,4%
United Kingdom 2002 8,88 ‐0,27% 8,00 0,42% ‐9,9% ‐2,2%
Ireland 2002 9,13 1,35% 10,99 3,76% 20,4% 60,6%
Japan 2002 9,15 0,49% 10,50 0,05% 14,8% 8,9%
Germany 2002 10,65 ‐0,78% 11,70 ‐0,67% 9,9% 11,4%
Russian Federation 2004 10,66 0,43% 9,28 1,51% ‐12,9% ‐0,9%
Finland 2002 10,97 0,95% 9,33 1,45% ‐15,0% ‐9,8%
Denmark 2002 11,01 ‐1,47% 12,69 ‐0,40% 15,3% 31,1%
Estonia 2002 11,06 1,79% 7,37 4,79% ‐33,4% ‐4,6%
Netherlands 2002 11,08 ‐0,07% 14,99 0,95% 35,3% 52,8%
Czech Republic 2001 12,00 ‐0,04% 8,83 0,24% ‐26,4% ‐23,8%
Belgium 2002 12,14 ‐0,65% 12,37 0,38% 1,8% 15,3%
Canada 2002 15,67 0,87% 16,02 1,06% 2,3% 4,6%
Australia 2007 15,87 1,55% 12,73 1,96% ‐19,7% ‐15,6%








Notes: The 40 sample countries ordered with respect to their 1995 per capita emission levels. CO2 emissions and
footprints in tons of CO2 per capita. Grey shades indicate countries in which the carbon footprint has fallen. Domestic
CO2 emissions are from the IEA. Carbon footprints computed using MRIO approach and approximating RoW I-O
tables with the GDP per capita matching method described in the text.
25Table II: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Log CO2 emissions (per capita) 0.05 0.11 ‐0.15 0.50 iea.int
Log CO2 footprint (per capita) 0.10 0.10 ‐0.12 0.32
Net CO2 imports, share of emissions 0.05 0.10 ‐0.18 0.29
Kyoto commitment dummy 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 unfccc.int
ICC dummy 0.68 0.40 0.00 1.00 treaties.un.org
ICC dummy, spatial lag 0.52 0.63 0.01 2.65
log population, time lag 0.03 0.03 ‐0.05 0.10 PWT 7.0
Log GDP 0.42 0.13 0.23 0.83 PWT 7.0
EU dummy 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
WTO dummy 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 wto.org
Polity IV  0.44 1.36 ‐1.00 8.00 www.systemicpeace.org
Log stock of other MEAs 0.28 0.14 0.13 0.72 iea.uoregon.edu




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table V: Robustness checks – Summary table IV estimates
Sample
emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
#
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) (A9)
Kyoto (0,1) ‐0.054* 0.097** 0.161*** ‐0.077** 0.096** 0.181*** 0.010 0.144*** 0.157***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.046) (0.050)
Over‐ID test (p) 0.235 0.728 0.153 0.443 0.533 0.110 0.237 0.789 0.203
Weak ID test (F) 33.160 33.160 33.160 38.140 38.140 38.140 12.880 12.880 12.880
Instrument(s):
emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
#
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9)
Kyoto (0,1) ‐0.138** 0.095 0.285*** ‐0.066* 0.089* 0.162*** ‐0.083** 0.070* 0.173***
(0.066) (0.057) (0.097) (0.033) (0.046) (0.045) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043)
Over‐ID test (p) 0.6360 0.4760 0.3470








(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8) (C9)
Kyoto (0,1) ‐0.076** 0.064 0.136*** 0.062 0.039 0.136*** 0.089* 0.064 0.167***
(0.032) (0.041) (0.037) (0.051) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044)
Over‐ID test (p) 0.333 0.722 0.337 0.398 0.521 0.223 0.777 0.723 0.127
Weak ID test (F) 36.54 36.54 36.54 34.95 34.95 34.95 34.95 34.95 34.95
Window:
emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
# emissions footprint imports
#
(D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) (D7) (D8) (D9)
Kyoto (0,1) ‐0.053** 0.077* 0.135*** ‐0.085** 0.091* 0.189*** ‐0.063** 0.011 0.079**
(0.026) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.047) (0.047) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033)
Over‐ID test (p) 0.161 0.692 0.092 0.211 0.711 0.0901 0.325 0.293 0.328









Notes: N=40 countries, T=2. Default speciﬁcation: pre-treatment average (1997-2000), post-treatment average
(2004-07); excluded instruments for Kyoto variable: ratiﬁcation status of ICC treaty, spatial lag thereof, and lagged
growth rate of population; 2SLS (two stage least squares). All regressions include the full list of covariates as in
columns (10) to (12) in Table III and a constant (not shown). Full regression output in Tables A1 to A4 in the
web appendix. Standard errors and ﬁrst-stage diagnostics are heteroskedasticity-robust and ﬁnite-sample adjusted.
* p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
# Net carbon imports as a share of domestic carbon emissions. ## Footprint per GDP.
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